



## *ROAD Project Lessons Learnt*

Platform Industriële Warmte, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2018, Delft  
Andy Read, ROAD Technical Director

SUPPORTED BY



Government of the Netherlands



Co-financed by the European Union  
European Energy Programme for Recovery

## Co-operating Partners ROAD

- **Maasvlakte CCS Project C.V.** is a joint venture of:

- Uniper
- ENGIE





- In **co-operation** with intended partners:

- TAQA, then Oranje-Nassau Energie
- Port of Rotterdam




- With **financial support** of:


- European Commission (EU)
- Government of the Netherlands
- Global CCS Institute




## Long and Winding ROAD: 10 Years on CCS




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
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
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
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
## Long and Winding ROAD: 10 Years on CCS







**Power plant**  
⚡ Output: 1 070 MWe  
Efficiency: 46%  
Capture ready



NOT ON SCALE




Depleted Gas Reservoir P18-4 -3,500m

**Power plant**

- ⚡ Output: 1 070 MWe
- Efficiency: 46%
- Capture ready

**Capture Plant: Fluor**

- Output: 169 t/h CO<sub>2</sub> on 250MW<sub>e</sub>
- Capture Efficiency: 90%
- CO<sub>2</sub> purity >99.9%
- 22% reduction in power plant output (if full scale) due to steam and power use (includes compression).




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



- Pipeline length:
  - 5 km onshore, 20 km offshore
- Diameter: 16 inch
- Transport capacity:
  - 5 Mt/yr (dense)
- Design specs:
  - 140 bar (max.)
  - 80 °C (max.)
- Pipeline insulated



- Depleted gas reservoir P18
- Operator: TAQA
- Depth: -3,500 m
- Storage capacity:
  - 35 Mt (P18)
  - 8 Mt (P18-4)
- Available: 2014
- Alternatives / future expansion options are in focus












## Highlights on Capture,

- Supplier selection process went very well
- Multiple suppliers available
- Was accepted by EC Auditors as demonstrating best value



## Highlights on Capture

### Capture

- “Proven” capture technology available on market:
  - Multiple suppliers offering robust designs
- But some technical unknowns due to limited experience:
  - Design of 2012 would have needed some modification:
    - Corrosion / degradation caused by leaching of coal ash
    - Aerosols in flue gas causing high solvent emissions
  - Solutions were found in pilot test campaigns and added to 2016 design, so it is wise to allow for some contingency and some ‘teething’ problems
  - ... but engineers can solve all the engineering problems
- **Conclusion: the technology is available and will work**

## Highlights on Transport

### Transport

- Some remaining technical uncertainties:
  - How to predict and manage two-phase flow behaviour (including transients)
  - QRA modelling for (onshore) CO<sub>2</sub> transport pipeline needs further development (e.g. “domino effect”)
- But the pipeline is largely conventional technology.
- **Conclusion: the technology is available and will work**

## Highlights on Storage

### Storage

- Some remaining technical uncertainties:
  - Transients and two-phase flow in the well
  - Tolerance of the well to repeated temperature changes
- But a safe design was developed.
- Major regulatory barrier: Storage Liabilities.
  - The costs of long term storage liabilities are largely controlled by regulators and/or Government, and are largely out of the control of the operator. These liabilities need to be carried by the Government.
  - Especially true for large-scale or long-term projects.
- **Conclusions:**
  - The storage technology is available and will work,
  - But storage regulation is not (yet) fit for purpose.

## Why did ROAD fail?

- **Nobody was prepared to pay for it**
- Industrial partners do not have a business case:
  - Neither short-term nor long-term (CO<sub>2</sub> price doesn't work on its own)
  - Perception that “industry must contribute” was not shared by industry!
- Public funders did not have sufficient public and political support:
  - CCS perceived as extending life-time of coal plants
  - CCS “competes” with investments in renewables
  - CCS positioned as (optional) measure of ‘last resort’
- **In summary: ROAD was a project without a customer**

## Key lesson learnt

- Government has to fund CCS:
  - There is no other customer
- To succeed the projects must be designed and run to maximise long term Government support.
- Therefore do things which make it easy for the Government to support you, and hard for them to stop.

## Personal recommendations for a new project

- Start small - if expensive, it's too tempting to cut the budget
- A “no regrets” first step:
  - No implied lock-in to follow-on projects - that scares people
  - But scalable - support the long term decarbonisation vision
- Select non-controversial capture and storage sites
  - e.g. waste incinerator (avoid fossil fuel if possible) and off-shore gas storage
- Create a local (public) value proposition and local supporters - e.g. supporting jobs, local industry, CO<sub>2</sub> use if possible (e.g. greenhouses)
- Avoid large profits for private parties (politically inexplicable)
  - Therefore Government / public bodies must carry long term risks (e.g. storage liabilities)
- Create / support an active pro-CCS political lobby
  - Publicly, proactively advocate the project and CCS in general



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